<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Lin Ma</title><link>https://lma.codeberg.page/</link><description>Recent content on Lin Ma</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><copyright>&amp;copy; 2026 Lin MA</copyright><atom:link href="https://lma.codeberg.page/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Contact</title><link>https://lma.codeberg.page/contact/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lma.codeberg.page/contact/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Email:&lt;/strong&gt; &#10;&lt;a href="mailto:lin.ma@iwh-halle.de"&gt;lin.ma@iwh-halle.de&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Address:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;&#10;Department of Laws, Regulations and Factor Markets&#10;Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)&lt;br&gt;&#10;Kleine Maerkerstrasse 8&#10;06108 Halle (Saale), Germany&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;img src="https://lma.codeberg.page/img/photo_LinMA_EFA.jpg" alt="EFA 2025" width="400"&gt;</description></item><item><title>Research</title><link>https://lma.codeberg.page/research/</link><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://lma.codeberg.page/research/</guid><description>&lt;h2 id="job-market-paper"&gt;Job Market Paper&#10; &lt;a href="#job-market-paper"&gt;&lt;svg class="anchor-symbol" aria-hidden="true" height="26" width="26" viewBox="0 0 22 22" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"&gt;&#10; &lt;path d="M0 0h24v24H0z" fill="currentColor"&gt;&lt;/path&gt;&#10; &lt;path d="M3.9 12c0-1.71 1.39-3.1 3.1-3.1h4V7H7c-2.76.0-5 2.24-5 5s2.24 5 5 5h4v-1.9H7c-1.71.0-3.1-1.39-3.1-3.1zM8 13h8v-2H8v2zm9-6h-4v1.9h4c1.71.0 3.1 1.39 3.1 3.1s-1.39 3.1-3.1 3.1h-4V17h4c2.76.0 5-2.24 5-5s-2.24-5-5-5z"&gt;&lt;/path&gt;&#10; &lt;/svg&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&#10;&lt;/h2&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&#10;&lt;a href="https://lma.codeberg.page/files/JMP_LinMA.pdf"&gt;Call Signal&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Abstract:&lt;/strong&gt; I develop a model showing that a callable debt contract allows outside investors to learn private information about the borrower from its voluntary decision to prepay – and, by the same logic, from the absence of that decision – even though neither choice carries an explicit signalling benefit to the issuer. Consistent with the model, I find that issuers’ credit default swap (CDS) spreads rise by 15 to 34 basis points in the six months following a decision not to exercise an in-the-money call option, while spreads remain stable for issuers that do call. Non-calling issuers’ subsequent operating performance also deteriorates relative to that of calling peers.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>