Research

Job Market Paper

Call Signal

Abstract: I develop a model showing that a callable debt contract allows outside investors to learn private information about the borrower from its voluntary decision to prepay – and, by the same logic, from the absence of that decision – even though neither choice carries an explicit signalling benefit to the issuer. Consistent with the model, I find that issuers’ credit default swap (CDS) spreads rise by 15 to 34 basis points in the six months following a decision not to exercise an in-the-money call option, while spreads remain stable for issuers that do call. Non-calling issuers’ subsequent operating performance also deteriorates relative to that of calling peers.

Publication

Out of sight, out of mind: Divestments and the global reallocation of pollutive assets (with Tobias Berg and Daniel Streitz)

Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 182, 2026, 104308, ISSN 0304-405X, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2026.104308.

Abstract: We document a global reallocation of pollutive assets as a response to investor pressure: large firms facing increased investor pressure divest foreign-located pollutive assets to firms that are less in the limelight. There is no evidence of increased engagement in any other emission reduction activities. We estimate that 369 million metric tons (mt) of CO2e are reallocated via divestments in the post-Paris Agreement period. Our results indicate that investor pressure to decarbonize reshapes the global conglomerate structure of large firms.

Working Paper

The Art of Timing: Managing Sudden Stop Risk in Corporate Credit Markets (with Daniel Streitz and Fabrice Tourre)

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4602788

Abstract: High yield firms aggressively exercise the call option embedded in their bonds. We construct a new measure of option moneyness and show that firms efficiently exercise the interest rate and spread option implicit in these contracts. Controlling for moneyness, firms frequently prepay bonds and issue new debt if rollover risk is high. We develop and estimate a structural model to quantify the costs and benefits of dynamically managing this risk. The ability to use callable debt almost entirely dissipates dead-weight losses from rollover risk. Creditor-shareholder conflicts re- duce the effectiveness of this dynamic hedging strategy for highly levered firms.